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THE JUS COGENS DIMENSIONS OF NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY
Public concern and debate over the role of nuclear power dramatically
increased in the United States in the past year. Incidents such as that at
Three Mile Island focused attention on the problems of nuclear technology,
while the OPEC oil cartel's price increases exacerbated our precarious
energy situation. The claims and threats made by both sides of the nuclear
argument have done more to obscure than to clarify the role of nuclear
power in our future energy policy. Only an analysis of its risks and benefits,
together with a comparison with proven alternatives, can serve as a rational
basis for decisions on the future of nuclear power.
This analysis and comparison should proceed on a global basis because
other nations, unlike the United States, may be unable to forego the nuclear
option. Americans tend to forget that our ample coal supplies and other
energy resources are not shared by many nations that also face the global
oil shortage. In the absence of proven alternatives to oil or nuclear power,
many industrial and third world nations are seriously considering the
nuclear option. In light of this worldwide energy situation, the problems of
nuclear safety, waste disposal, and weapons proliferation' cannot be ana-
lyzed on a purely national basis.
Nuclear energy will do more harm than good if its use as a power
source increases the threat of nuclear war. The potential for nuclear weap-
ons proliferation resulting from the admitted lack of effective safeguards on
peaceful power technology creates a situation that is dangerous to inter-
national peace and order, morally unjustifiable, and contrary to world opin-
ion and common good. In a very practical sense, the sale of nuclear
materials and technology is equivalent to the sale of nuclear weapons or
weapons potential. As international nuclear trade increases, so does the
risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.
This Note will examine the nuclear weapons proliferation problem
that is coupled with the development and sale of peaceful nuclear technol-
1. The problems of nuclear plant safety and waste disposal are not considered in this
Note except to the extent that they contribute to the problem of weapons proliferation. The
safety and disposal issues are not proposed asjus cogens subjects.
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ogy, and its relation to the treaty law doctrine of ':/us cogens. ' '2 In its basic
form, this doctrine posits the existence of certain fundamental norms of
international law that states cannot vary by agreement.3
Characterization of a jus cogens norm is a difficult and controversial
task because no single accepted functional definition of this concept exists.
Nonetheless, four criteria capturing the essence of this doctrine can be
derived from the works of leading publicists.4 These criteria are: (1) a
foundation in morality; (2) importance to international peace and order; (3)
general acceptance in the international community; and (4) serving global
interests rather than those of an individual state. For the purposes of this
Note, this combination of tests need not be absolutely precise and it is not
offered as such. These criteria yield exclusive results, however, because
they incorporate all of the essential elements ofjus cogens norms.
This Note will first demonstrate the relationship between peaceful
nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. Then the concept ofjus cogens
and the criteria by which ajus cogens norm can be identified will be dis-
cussed. Next, these criteria will be applied to the proposedjus cogens norm
of nuclear weapons nonproliferation. Finally, state practice will be
examined to check the results of the theoretical analysis.
I
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
A. THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER
The energy shortage is a global problem that presents few options to a
world highly dependent on oil. Nations lacking significant proven coal
reserves and oil deposits need alternatives to expensive and limited oil sup-
plies immediately, but nuclear energy is the only proven power source cur-
rently available.5 Nuclear power is thus seen as an escape from escalating
2. Jus cogens, or "compelling law," can be contrasted to jus disposithivum, laws that yield
to the will of citizens. I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 112
(1973).
3. See, e.g., G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 27-29 (1971); I.
SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 21-22; J. SZTUCKI, Jus COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES 6 (1974); Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International
Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 55 (1966); Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31
AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 571-73 (1937).
4. See authorities cited in note 3 supra.
5. The difficulties of converting solar energy into electricity presently limit the use of
solar power, potentially a major energy source. Solar energy will not be capable of replacing
current electricity-generating methods for at least several decades. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1979,
at A7, col. 1.
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oil prices6 and increasing balance of payments pressures7 that provides a
domestic source8 of the energy required for stable economic development.
In the near future, the relative cost and availability of energy to different
nations will become one of the most important determinants of their eco-
nomic performances. Thus the pressure is increasing on energy-poor
nations to turn to the ready technology of nuclear power.
Third world nations seek greater energy supplies to facilitate their
entrance into global commerce,9 but these developing nations are those
most injured by oil price increases.' 0 An official of the International Mone-
tary Fund recently noted that the dramatic increase in the price of oil has
created an unmanageable debt burden for some developing countries." I In
addition to the fiscal problems, supplies of fuel, fertilizer, and food in devel-
oping nations will decrease as the industrial nations compete more success-
fully for available energy resources. At the May 1979 UNCTAD
Conference' 2 these problems were raised, and the concern and commitment
of Western nations were reaffirmed.' 3 West German Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt called for the increased use of nuclear power in less developed
nations as a means of bridging the growing gap between those nations and
the industrial powers. 14 The clear trend is toward the expanding use of
nuclear power in the third world.' 5
Western Europe faces a severe energy crisis through the remainder of
6. The price of crude oil increased 60% between December 1978 and mid-July 1979.
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1979, at D3, col. 1.
7. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recently
forecasted economic stagnation, slower growth, and higher unemployment and inflation rates
for its member nations because of 1979 oil price increases. The 24 OECD member nations
now have an aggregate balance of payments deficit of $30 to $40 billion, largely because of oil
costs. The world's developing nations face an even larger collective deficit of about $50 bil-
lion. Id.
8. Because raw nuclear fuels are not found in every nation, some importation must occur.
But use of the breeder reactors currently under development could virtually eliminate depen-
dence on imported fuels. After the initial importation of the enriched uranium or plutonium
fuels, breeder reactors "could in time provide energy comparatively independent of foreign
influence." J. GRAY, M. KRATZER, K. LESLIE, H. PA1GE & S. SHONTZIS, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION ON BREEDER REACTORS 4-9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. GRAY].
9. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1979, at Al, col. 4.
10. Kenya is typical of the developing nations for which higher oil prices mean slower
development. Id, Aug. 27, 1979, at Al, col. 1.
11. Id, July 6, 1979, at Dl, col. I (remarks of Jacques de Larosi6re, Managing Director,
International Monetary Fund).
12. The fifth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development con-
vened in Manila on May 7, 1979. Id, May 7, 1979, at A5, col. 1.
13. Garret FitzGerald, former Foreign Minister of Ireland, expressed this commitment as
"the obligations injustice that rich peoples owe poor peoples." Id
14. Id, June 8, 1979, at B6, col. 1.
15. Id, May 7, 1979, at Al, col. I.
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this century. 16 Although West Germany, with abundant coal reserves, ele-
vated the use of German coal to the position of first national priority for the
1980's,17 nuclear power figures prominently in European planning. The
French Minister of Industry arid Scientific Research stated that the devel-
opment of the French fast breeder reactor is necessary for the economic
survival of his nation.18 Similarly, Western nations, including the United
States, set high nuclear power goals at the 1978 Bonn economic conference.
The communique following the conference stated, "[Tihe further develop-
ment of nuclear energy is essential and the reduction in the execution of
nuclear power programs has to be reversed."' 19 The Common Market's
Energy Minister added, "[W]e have no alternative. '20
The Comecon nations find that they can no longer look to the Soviet
Union for their oil. In a dramatic turnabout, the U.S.S.R., once a leading
oil producer, is expected to begin importing oil soon.2' Consequently, the
Comecon nations have adopted large-scale nuclear plans. 22 By 1990, these
nations hope to meet one-half of their energy needs through the use of
nuclear power.23 In assessing his country's energy situation, the president
of the Soviet Academy of Sciences called the broad development of nuclear
energy, including the use of breeder reactors, "the only sensible way of
avoiding an energy crisis." 24
Almost every energy-importing nation views the use of nuclear power
as necessary for the prevention of economic disruption. By the year 2000,
the International Atomic Energy Agency expects thirty-five to forty-five
percent of the world's electricity to be generated by nuclear power.25 Few
16. The pressure exerted on Western European economies by increased oil prices and
decreasing oil supplies is well-documented. See, e.g., id, Aug. 9, 1979, at D5, col. 3; Id, July
19, 1979, at D3, col. 1; id, July 6, 1979, at Dl, col. 1; Id, June 29, 1979, at D4, cols. 1, 5.
17. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt explained the purpose of this proposed
shift from oil to coal as "allow[ing] us to be independent from [sic] foreign decisions." Id,
July 5, 1979, at DI, col. 3. West German coal reserves are expected to last at least 100 years at
the current rate of consumption. Id, at D5, col. 3.
18. M. Rene Monory tied the development of French nuclear power plants to "the life and
comfort of the French people" and warned that without them, "France will become a little
nation." The Times (London), Aug. 3, 1977, at 6, col. e.
19. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1979, at AI, col. I.
20. Id.
21. 1978 LLOYD'S MAR. AND COM. L.Q. 189; N.Y. Times, July 30, 1979, at DI, col. 3.
22. The Comecon nations recently signed a three-year pact designed to allow each to spe-
cialize in one phase of nuclear energy development. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
were assigned the task of nuclear reactor construction, but the roles of the other eight nations
were not disclosed. Boston Globe, June 29, 1979, at 8, col. 5.
23. 1978 LLOYD'S, supra note 21, at 189.
24. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1979, at A19, col. 3. The current five-year plan (ending in 1980)
set the goal of generating seven percent of the nation's electricity in nuclear power plants. Id.
25. Id, May 7, 1979, at AI, col. I.
[Vol. 13:63
NUCLEAR JUS COGENS
nations, however, possess the technological or economic resources necessary
for the development of a domestic nuclear power industry. For the major-
ity of nations, international nuclear trade offers a solution.
B. INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TRADE
Sales of nuclear technology and materials are now commonplace.
Hundreds of nuclear power plants are now under construction around the
world by firms from the United States,26 the Soviet Union,27 and thirteen
other nations.28 France recently contracted to sell two nuclear plants using
U.S. technology to China.29 Major nuclear deals, such as the £500 million
U.K.-Japan contract for the transportation and reprocessing of spent Japa-
nese nuclear fuels, 30 are becoming more frequent.
3 1
Despite potential problems of health, safety, waste disposal,32 terror-
ism, and civil liberties, 33 trade in nuclear technology has become big busi-
ness. All previous international nuclear transfers, however, were based on
the fundamental presumption that the weapons proliferation safeguards
were adequate. 34 That presumption has proven false as the integral con-
26. See World List ofNuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR NEWS, Aug. 1978, at 67-85.
27. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1978, at 82.
28. NUCLEAR NEWS, supra note 26, at 67-85. These nations are Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
France, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and West Germany.
29. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1978, at 5, col. 1.
30. The Times (London), May 25, 1978, at 21, col. a.
31. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FACTS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERA-
TION 193-205 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION] (projected
revenue of $1.5 billion from U.S. nuclear exports in 1980); G. Handl, Abnormally Dangerous
Activities of International Concern: The Case of Nuclear Power Generation 268 n.259
(unpublished doctoral dissertation in Yale Law School Library) (noting an $80 billion backlog
of orders in the German nuclear industry).
32. If nuclear power is to become a long-term solution to the world's energy problem, it
must achieve acceptable standards on all three of its problems: safety, waste disposal, and
weapons proliferation. The standards set for nuclear energy should be reasonably related to
those for alternative fuels, including coal. A comparison suggests that nuclear power is prefer-
able to coal on the issues of health, safety, and waste disposal. See AUDUBON, Nov. 1978, at
69-70; N.Y. Times, July 10, 1979, at B8, col. 5; id, Nov. 20, 1978, at D1, col. 1; G. Handl, supra
note 31, at 206-325.
.33. Britons have expressed fears that increased nuclear production will require stiff secur-
ity measures to prevent and combat terrorism at the expense of civil liberties and human
rights. The Times (London), Mar. 7, 1978, at 17, col. b. Testifying before a congressional
committee, an American corporate official warned that the government might react to terrorist
threats against nuclear power plants in ways "that would generate a great deal of very oppres-
sive searching and wiretapping and invasion of privacy." Oversight Hearings on Nuclear
Energy-International Proliferation ofNuclear Technology: Hearings Be/ore the Subcomm. on
Energy and the Environment ofthe House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Pt. 3) 96 (1975) (testimony of Theodore Taylor, Chairman, International Research
and Technology Div., General Research Corp.).
34. Nuclear export policies illustrate this fundamental presumption that the prescribed
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nection between nuclear technology and nuclear weapons potential comes
to light.35
C. INADEQUACY OF DIVERSION SAFEGUARDS
Diversion of fissionable nuclear material from power production to
weapons manufacture already poses a serious threat to international
order,36 but the risk of such illicit manufacture will greatly increase with the
advent of breeder reactors.37 This risk arises from the inadequacy of the
safeguards38 presently employed in connection with nuclear exports. The
233 commercial nuclear power plants already built, as well as the 323 under
construction,39 provide not only sources of materials for diversion to illicit
national and individual projects, but also tempting targets for terrorist
activities. The present safeguards can completely prevent neither the sur-
controls and guarantees are sufficient to prevent proliferation. For example, French President
Giscard d'Estaing once said, "We must be very careful not to increase the risk of nuclear
danger in the world. . . . France will never sell. . . an installation to any country that will
not accept all the controls and guarantees that have been decided for such projects." U.S.
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 323 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 DISARMAMENT DOCUMENTS] (extract of interview at the National
Press Club, May 20, 1976).
35. The fallacy of the presumption of effective safeguards will have dramatic effects on
existing international nuclear supply contracts. The parties may be relieved of their contrac-
tual obligations under the international legal doctrines of mistake and rebus sic stantibus. See
note 159 infra; Szegilongi, Unilateral Revisions ofInternational Nuclear Supply Arrangements,
12 INT'L LAW. 857, 860 (1978). The As cogens prohibition of nuclear weapons proliferation
propounded in this Note would achieve the same result.
36. See generally NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 31, at 213-26; INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 247-51 (M. Willrich ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS]; M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND
SAFEGUARDS 167-71 (1974).
37. The enriched fuel used in the breeder reactor fuel cycle is suitable for weapons pro-
duction without further processing whereas nuclear fuels presently used require expensive
reprocessing before reaching this stage. See NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 31, at 214-
17; M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note 36, at 15.
38. "Safeguards" is a generic term encompassing a variety of technological, procedural,
and physical measures designed to thwart theft or other diversion of delicate materials. See
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 31, at 227 (defining "safeguards" in the international
context as "systems designed to detect the diversion or theft of nuclear materials that could be
used in weapons or terror devices," and in the domestic context as "physical protection of
nuclear facilities against sabotage"); Smyth, The Needfor International Safeguards, in INTER-
NATIONAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 36, at 9 (defining "safeguards" to include "physical pro-
tection such as vaults, locks, and guards" and "[aiccounting methods supplemented by
sampling, analysis, and inspection").
The relative merits of different systems of safeguards is a technical subject beyond the scope
of this Note. At a minimum, "a nuclear safeguards system as a whole should perform four
interrelated functions: 1. prevention of theft; 2. detection of theft; 3. recovery of stolen mate-
rial; 4. response to threats of nuclear violence." M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note 36, at
125.
39. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1979, at AI, col. 1.
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reptitious diversion nor the theft of nuclear materials. 40
A recent congressional study concluded, "Without doubt, the potential
for proliferation depends upon the amount and conditions of future nuclear
trade among nations. The more nuclear materials that move in inter-
national commerce, the greater the probability that some can be success-
fully stolen or diverted-unless extraordinary precautionary measures are
taken."'4 ' Willrich and Taylor, in their evaluation of nuclear risks and safe-
guards, reached a similar conclusion: "Without effective safeguards to pre-
vent nuclear theft, the development of nuclear power will create substantial
risks to the security and safety of the American people and people gener-
ally."'42
Just as nuclear power plants need not inevitably lead to nuclear weap-
ons, a nation determined to obtain nuclear weapons would not be stopped
by the absence of such plants. The diversion of fissile materials, an expen-
sive and dangerous act, is alarmingly easy. Once the fissile material is
available, the actual bomb construction is a relatively simple process.4 3
The low-enriched uranium fuel used in first-generation nuclear power
plants is unsuitable for nuclear weapons.44 But when this fuel is used in
atomic reactions, fissile plutonium is produced.4 5 After separation from the
spent fuel rods, plutonium is an ideal raw material for weapons.4 6 A recent
Oak Ridge study on the feasibility of a "quick and dirty" reprocessing plant
for extracting the plutonium from spent reactor fuel rods concluded that a
"bandit nation" could have such a plant in operation in six months and
produce enough plutonium for ten bombs per month.47 Given the rela-
tively simple mechanics of bomb construction, it is unavoidable that a
nation that legitimately develops or imports nuclear technology will
approach weapons capability without necessarily desiring to do so. Once
the potential is established, such a nation is only a political decision away
from weapons manufacture. Perceived threats to national security and
desires for "prestige" tend to push it towards weapons development.4 8
40. For example, Israel is widely suspected of hijacking 200 tons of uranium in 1968. This
fuel reportedly has been converted into weapons-grade plutonium at the Dimona reactor. The
Times (London), June 25, 1978, at 1, col. b.
41. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 31, at 193.
42. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note 36, at 169.
43. Id. at 20-21.
44. Id. at 16-17. Highly enriched uranium fuel used in research reactors need not undergo
nuclear modification or purification and is by itself an excellent weapons source. Id.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 15.
47. This study is described in The Times (London), Mar. 5, 1978, at 2, col. c.
48. For example, one of the factors underlying India's refusal to sign the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, is the threatened loss of prestige resulting from this affir-
1980]
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The connection between nuclear power and weapons proliferation will
grow stronger in the future with the introduction of breeder reactors.
Because the world's supply of uranium for conventional reactors is expected
to last only about as long as its oil supply,49 pressure is growing for the
development of breeder reactors. These plants could use nuclear fuels
many times more efficiently than conventional nuclear plants.50 This type
of plant requires reprocessing of spent fuels and uses fuel elements of a
fissile concentration sufficient for bomb production. Thus the difficult and
expensive enrichment step in illicit bomb production can be avoided by
acquiring breeder reactor fuel.51
France52 and the Soviet Union 53 are vigorously pursuing their breeder
reactor programs. Other nations are not far behind.5 4 Because of the
increased weapons proliferation danger associated with such a "plutonium
economy," President Carter hopes to defer development of breeder reactors
and opposes the reprocessing of nuclear fuel.55
In the face of the increasing proliferation problem, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization charged with the respon-
sibility of overseeing international nuclear safeguards, admits that its con-
trols are inadequate to prevent or discover the illicit diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear fuels.56 The U.S. system of safeguards has been con-
demned as "incomplete at this time" because of the lack of sufficient
"physical protection measures. '57 The recent discovery of the disappear-
mation of nonproliferation. See The Times (London), Jan. 9, 1978, at 5, col. d; J. GRAY, supra
note 8, at xi ("The main incentives for governments to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities
relate to security and perhaps prestige").
49. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1979, at Al, col. 1.
50. The Times (London), Dec. 5, 1977, at 16, col. a.
51. See NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 31, at 214-17.
52. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
53. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1979, at A19, col. 3; NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1978, at 85.
54. Belgium, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and West Germany are
developing breeder reactors. J. GRAY, supra note 8, at 2-1 to 18; The Times (London), May iI,
1978, at 8, col. g.
55. See President's Statement on Nuclear Power Policy, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 506-07 (Apr. 11, 1977) [hereinafter cited as President's Statement]; N.Y. Times, July 27,
1979, at A7, col. 1; id, Jan. 28, 1979, at F17, col. 1.
56. The Director General of the IAEA has stressed "the need for better control [over] and
physical protection of all nuclear material .... " 19 INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY BULL. 18
(Dec. 1977), extract reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, Docu-
MENTS ON DISARMAMENT 581, 582 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 DISARMAMENT Docs.].
57. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note 36, at 169. After the Indian nuclear explosion
in 1974, the United States "realized that safeguards, however important, are not always suffi-
cient." 1977 DISARMAMENT Docs., supra note 56, at 295, 297 (statement of Deputy Under
Sec. of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Nye, May 6, 1977). The U.S.
policy of restraining nuclear exports arose from this realization. Id.
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ance of a significant amount of highly enriched uranium from a Tennessee
facility confirms this assessment.58
Present safeguards cannot adequately protect sensitive materials
against illicit use. Until drastic changes are made to upgrade their effective-
ness-whether by placing nuclear facilities "under some enhanced form of
international control," 59 by the discovery of a new technical process like
Civex,60 or by some other scheme-the integral link between nuclear power
and weapons proliferation will remain. So long as this is the case, the sale




The basic proposition ofjfs cogens is the existence of certain funda-
mental legal norms that individual states may not vary by agreement. 6'
Thus, an act or agreement in violation of ajus cogens norm is illegal.62
Although examples are proffered of jus cogens norms, such as the
prohibitions of slavery and genocide,6 3 as well as conclusory attempts at
58. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1979, at A20, col. 3.
59. J. GRAY, supra note 8, at 6.
60. The Civex process was announced with some fanfare in February 1978. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1978, at Al, col. 6. The process would return purified uranium to the "blan-
ket" area surrounding the core of a breeder reactor. This uranium would mix with the pluto-
nium in the core to maintain a concentration of approximately 20% plutonium and 80%
uranium and other by-products. By maintaining a concentration of plutonium lower than the
approximately 60% required for weapons production, the process would avoid the production
of large amounts of plutonium suitable for diversion to weapons manufacture. Id. The proc-
ess has been criticized as adding little to the presently accepted safeguards because it neither
protects spent nuclear fuel nor sufficiently insulates the plutonium from potential diversion.
124 CONo. REC. E935 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
61. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. If two or more nations are powerless to vary
a fundamental norm by virtue of their united wills as expressed in an agreement, it logically
follows that one nation would have even less power to escape the compulsion of that norm
through unilateral action. In this respect, jus cogens is the international law analogue of
domestic "public policy" or "ordre public." Ian Sinclair, citing an earlier study by Krystina
Marek, demonstrated that the conditions necessary for the effective application of public pol-
icy in municipal law exist in international law, if at all, only in rudimentary form. I. SINCLAIR,
supra note 2, at 114; see also J. SZTUCKI, supra note 3, at 8-10.
62. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, art. 58, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 (1969) (U.S. signature, Apr. 24, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Conven-
tion], reprinted in United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records: Docu-
ments of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/ II/Add.2 (1971) 287, 296. Article 84
requires 35 ratifications or accessions before entering into force. Id, art. 84. As of October 4,
1979, 34 states had ratified the Convention. Remarks of Sir Humphrey Waldock (Oct. 4,
1979). Sir Humphrey predicted a rush of states to be the thirty-fifth ratifier. Id.
63. See, e.g., I. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 121-24; J. SZTUCKI, supra note 3, at 82-84.
19801
72 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
definition,64 no comprehensive definition of the doctrine enjoys universal
acceptance. Sir Humphrey Waldock, the fourth and final Rapporteur of
the Vienna Conference and current President of the International Court of
Justice, stated, "[Tlhere is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by
which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character
ofius cogens.' '65 This deficiency leads to the most damning criticism of the
doctrine: in the absence of an accepted definition against which to test an
allegedjus cogens norm, the doctrine will suffer abuse to the detriment of
valid treaty obligations. 66
Jus cogens norms are generally seen as those most basic to the inter-
national community, such as the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the
right of a nation to self-defense. 67 Sinclair tested the validity of the jus
cogens principle by questioning whether a treaty contravening certain pos-
tulated jus cogens norms would be enforced by an international court.68
Treaties to commit genocide, to foster slavery, or to commit armed aggres-
sion would be found illegal and, therefore, void.69
All parties to the Vienna Conference, 70 an attempt to codify inter-
national treaty law in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 71
accepted the basic concept ofjus cogens.72 Despite that basic agreement,
however, jus cogens remained the most controversial substantive issue of
the Conference.73 The parties attempted to define it by establishing criteria
forjus cogens norms and by agreeing on established rules of international
law that possessjus cogens character. The text of article 53 reads:
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus
cogens).
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a per-
emptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present
64. The most notable of these conclusory definitions is that embodied in the Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 62, art. 53. See text accompanying note 74 infra.
65. Second Report by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156/Add.1-3.
66. For example, if one state sought to escape its treaty obligation, it could simply classify
that obligation as an interference with its domestic jurisdiction and cite a norm prohibiting
such interference as us cogens. See Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 TEXAS L.
REv. 455, 470 (1965).
67. See, e.g., I. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 110-I1; Verdross, 31 AM. J. INT'L L., supra note
3, at 571-77.
68. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 129.
69. Id.
70. The Vienna Conference held two sessions in 1968-69.
71. See note 62 supra.
72. See I. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 124-28.
73. Id; see United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records: 1st Sess.,




Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.
74
This formulation is largely unsatisfactory because it provides neither crite-
ria nor examples of jus cogens norms. It is conclusory, dealing with the
consequences of ajus cogens norm rather than its prerequisites. The task of
defining parameters to identify peremptory norms of international law
remains.
Although the Vienna Convention was the first multilateral instrument
treating the concept of jus cogens, publicists have devoted considerable
attention to the doctrine. 75 It is possible to distill the mass of theoretical
proposals into the fourjus cogens criteria discussed in this Note.
Ian Sinclair's incisive analysis of thejus cogens controversy traces the
doctrine's roots to the fundamental conflict between natural and positive
law.76 Professor Verdross' articles on jus cogens and Professor Georg
Schwarzenberger's responses demonstrate this conflict. Verdross, who took
a leading position onjus cogens in his 1937 article,77 viewedjus cogens as a
moral principle in the leading rank of a hierarchy of norms. 78 In contrast,
Schwarzenberger argued that every previously asserted peremptory norm
was based in traditional positive manifestations of international law.79
Schwarzenberger further argued that permitting the doctrine to develop as
formlessly as it had would allow bad faith contentions ofjus cogens to the
detriment of otherwise valid agreements and the deterioration of inter-
national law in general.80 By adopting functional criteria that incorporate
74. Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 53.
75. See works cited in notes 2-3 supra.
76. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 113.
77. See note 3 supra.
78. Id. In a similar vein, Lord McNair wrote:
There are ... many rules of customary international law which stand in a higher
category and which cannot be set aside or modified by contracting States .... They
are rules which have been accepted, either expressly by treaty or tacitly by custom, as
being necessary to protect the public interests of the society of States or to maintain the
standards of public morality recognized by them.
A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 215 (1961).
79. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 3, at 29-56.
80. Schwarzenberger, supra note 66, at 470; see note 66 supra.
In taking a middle position, Sinclair illustrated the realities and limitations of thejus cogens
concept:
Whatever their doctrinal point of departure, the majority of jurists would ... con-
cede. . . that there is little or no evidence in positive international law for the concept
... ofjus cogens. But they would be constrained to admit that the validity of a treaty
... to wage a war of aggression ... or to engage in acts of... force against a third
State could not be upheld; and, having made this admission, they may be taken to
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the essential elements and meet the justified criticisms of thejus cogens con-
cept, this Note will avoid the quagmire of the naturalist-positivist contro-
versy.
A. THE FOUR Jus COGENS CRITERIA
1. A Foundation in Morality
The first criterion requires that the proposed jus cogens norm have a
moral basis. At an early date, Professor Verdross claimed that an essential
element of the doctrine ofjus cogens was the prohibition against "conclud-
ing treaties contra bonos mores."'8 ' He observed that every legal system
regulates the "rational and moral coexistence of the members of a commu-
nity,"' 82 and argued that the international legal system will protect shared
moral concepts essential to ordered relationships in the community of
nations. Thejus cogens concept thus serves to protect the "ethical minimum
recognized by all the states of the international community. ' 's3
Representatives to the Vienna Conference84 and one Special Rap-
porteur8 5 agreed that a jus cogens rule must have a moral basis.8 6 Simi-
larly, Sztucki's summary of leading publicists' views on jus cogens
have accepted the principle that there may exist norms of international law so funda-
mental to the maintenance of an international legal order that a treaty concluded in
violation of them is a nullity.
[I]n the present state of international society, the concept of an "international
legal order" of hierarchically superior norms binding all States is only just beginning
to emerge. . . .[An international jurist] would test any assertion that a particular rule
constitutes a norm ofjus cogens by reference to the evidence for its acceptance as such
by the international community as a whole, and [he] would require that the burden of
proof should be discharged by those who allege thejus cogens character of the rule.
I. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 129-30.
81. Verdross, 31 AM. J. INT'L L., supra note 3, at 572.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 574.
84. M. Lucien Yapobi, Ivory Coast Representative to the Vienna Conference, viewedjus
cogens as "introducing into international law the essential concept of morality on which the
fundamental principle of good faith was also based." Official Records, supra note 73, at 321.
85. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who succeeded Lauterpacht as Special Rapporteur in 1955,
echoed Verdross in concluding:
It is not possible-nor for present purposes necessary-to state exhaustively what are
the rules of international law that have the character ofjus cogens, but a feature com-
mon to them. . . is that they involve not only legal rules but considerations of morals
and of international good order.
Third Report by G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 40-41,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ 15 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
86. The problems inherent in defining "morality" need not be addressed heye. The term is
used in its intuitive sense and none of the examples ofjus cogens norms considered in this Note
offer any difficulty in their classification as moral issues. The problems that might result from
self-serving use of this term by nations seeking to advance a particular rule as a jus cogens
norm are addressed by the third and fourth criteria. See text accompanying notes 93-101 infra.
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repeatedly stresses the central importance of morality and ethics.87 Lord
McNair's formulation is a leading example of the moral element of jus
cogens.88
2. Importance to International Peace and Order
The second criterion evaluates the importance of the proposed norm to
international peace and order. Verdross maintained that these peremptory
norms govern relationships within the international community,8 9 a role
that makesjus cogens norms central to international order. Other publicists
have agreed on this aspect of ajus cogens norm. Sztucki cited descriptions
of jus cogens as "fundamental constitutional rules of international legal
order," 90 and "principles of social organization and stability."91 Sinclair
offered pacta sunt servanda as an example of this type of indispensable
international norm.92
3. General Acceptance in the International Community
The third criterion, unlike the first two, is a practical and more objec-
tive test. Rather than focusing on the subject matter of the proposed norm,
this criterion evaluates its acceptance by the international community.
Although the binding force of a jus cogens norm must ultimately derive
from right and reason based on the current needs of the international com-
munity, the difficulty of objectively evaluating these aspects of emerging
norms favors the addition of this practical test. Moreover, its retrospective
orientation serves as a check on the prospective tests of the first two criteria.
A fundamental moral precept important to world order as identified by the
first two criteria should be widely accepted, and it is reasonable to require a
demonstration of such general acceptance before classifying it as a jus
cogens norm.
An additional advantage of this criterion is that it answers the valid
fears of an amorphousjus cogens doctrine expressed by Schwarzenberger. 93
By requiring evidence of general international acceptance, it indirectly
deters self-serving claims ofjus cogens that could threaten the "sanctity of
the pledged word."'94
This type of retrospective test is the only one prescribed by the Vienna
87. See J. SZTUCKI, supra note 3, at 77-79, 82-84.
88. See note 78 supra.
89. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
90. J. SZTUCKI, supra note 3, at 78 (describing an earlier study by Menzel).
91. Id. (describing an earlier study by Rolin).
92. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 115-16.
93. See text accompanying note 80 supra; note 66 supra.
94. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 66, at 478.
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Convention. Article 53 requires that ajus cogens norm be " accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole."'95 This
vague language is susceptible to a rigid interpretation that would unneces-
sarily restrict the application of the doctrine.96 Although article 53 does not
require universal acceptance, it does not indicate the level of international
recognition that would be deemed sufficient. Because general acceptance is
both a consequence of and a prerequisite to thejus cogens character of a
rule, proposedjus cogens norms should not be measured against an inflexi-
ble level of acceptance. The degree of recognition required should be
allowed to vary inversely with the strength of a norm's showing on the other
criteria. As a guideline, the proposed norm should acquire international
acceptance equivalent to that enjoyed by the norms prohibiting slavery,
genocide, and agression. The required level of acceptance, however, should
be less than that required for the establishment of customary law.97
4. Serving Global Interests Rather than those of an Individual State
The fourth criterion, sometimes advanced as the criterion ofjus cogens
norms,98 incorporates important elements of the first three criteria. In the
95. Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 53.
96. The phrase "international community of States as a whole" in article 53 is difficult to
define. See Rao, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 14 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 362 (1974). Delegates to the Vienna Conference could not agree on the level of
acceptance required. Rao observes that "insistence on absolutely unanimous acceptance of a
peremptory norm is to practically exclude all possibility of its coming into existence." Id. at
381. Rao concludes that "it is sufficient to bring a peremptory norm into existence if it is
accepted by a substantial majority of States representing the principal legal systems of the
world." Id.
97. Customary international law emphasizes states' consent whereasjur cogens rules, by
definition, cannot be disclaimed by agreement. This Note adopts this third criterion as a con-
firmation of the other criteria to meet valid criticisms of the abstract concept ofjus cogens and
not as an essential element ofjus cogens norms in itself. The rigor of these criteria can only be
improved by adding this requirement.
Nonetheless, ascertaining the degree of acceptance required forjus cogens is a difficult task.
One might assume that ajus cogens norm that has some fundamental importance and, accord-
ing to the first and second criteria, deals with an important moral issue affecting the inter-
national community should enjoy a degree of acceptance at least equal to that required of rules
of customary law, which generally deal with more mundane matters of mutual convenience.
History, however, does not bear out that assumption. Until recently, see note 106 infra, the
three mile territorial sea limit, which is no more than a rule of convenience, was more carefully
observed than the prohibitions of slavery, genocide, and aggression.
Sztucki warns that universal acceptance alone does not indicate jus cogens character. J.
SZTUCKI, supra note 3, at 75. For example, the International Telecommunication Convention,
done Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572, enjoys such acceptance, but no one has
suggested it as ajus cogens norm.
98. See Verdross, 60 AM. J. INT'L L., supra note 3, at 58. Verdross wrote, "The criterion
for these rules consists in the fact that they do not exist to satisfy the needs of the individual
states but the higher interest of the whole international community." Id. Lavu Mulimba,
Zambian Representative to the Vienna Conference, "agreed with Professor Verdross that the
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Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice endorsed a prin-
ciple similar to this fourth criterion. The Court spoke of "the obligations of
a State towards the international community as a whole. . . . [which] [b]y
their very nature. . . are the concern of all States." 9 9 In the earlier Geno-
cide Convention case, the Court similarly observed, "In such a convention
the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely
have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those
high purposes. . . of the convention."' 00
This criterion of a paramount interest in the international well-being is
related to the third criterion. A norm serving an overriding international
interest should enjoy general acceptance. But the fourth criterion more
directly eliminates self-serving claims of jus cogens by emphasizing the
requirement that such norms be directed towards the common good of the
international community.t 0 '
B. AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF THE CRITERIA
Regardless of their theoretical justifications 0 2 or endorsements by
publicists, the four criteria must yield proper results if they are to have any
practical value. For the purposes of this Note, it is crucial that only jus
criterion for rules ofius cogens was that they served the interests of the whole international
community, not the needs of individual States." Official Records, supra note 73, at 322.
99. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v.
Spain), [1970] I.C.J. 4, 32. The Court continued:
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination.
Id. Note thejus cogens nature of these prohibitions.
100. Advisory Opinion Concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15, 23.
101. The existence of an accepted test ofjus cogens and the mandatory adjudication proce-
dures of articles 65 and 66 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 62, would also decrease the
likelihood of a selfishjus cogens claim. These procedures ultimately involve the International
Court of Justice.
102. The fourjus cogens criteria propounded in this Note can be derived from Grotius'
explanation and defense of natural law. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PAcis LIBRI TRES (F.
Kelsey trans. 1925). In light of man's social nature and drive for the maintenance of a social
order, Grotius explained that a "well-tempered judgment" often requires conduct in the inter-
est of society that is contrary to the individual's interest. Id, Prolegomena §§ 5-10. This
municipal law analysis parallels the second and fourth criteria presented herein.
In his definition of natural law, Grotius wrote, "The law of nature is a dictate of right
reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational
nature, has in it a quality of moralbaseness or moralnecessity .. " Id. at ch. 1, § 10 (empha-
sis added). The firstjus cogens criterion echoes this moral foundation. Grotius would look to
"the common sense of mankind" to determine the quality of a proposed rule of natural law.
Id. at ch. 1, § 12. The third criterion proposed in this Note employs a similar evaluation of the
general acceptance of a proposed norm.
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cogens norms satisfy the criteria. An empirical evaluation of the criteria
demonstrates their accuracy and exclusivity.
The postulated jus cogens norms prohibiting slavery, genocide, and
aggression satisfy each criteria. Each prohibition contains a dominating
moral element and affects international peace and order. Each is accepted
by the international community.' 0 3 These norms also serve interests of the
international community as a whole rather than those of any individual
state. Thus all fourjus cogens criteria are met. °'0
The more important test of these criteria is their effectiveness in sepa-
rating generally accepted rules of international law fromjus cogens norms.
For example, the concept of freedom of the seas satisfies the third and
fourth criteria by virtue of its general acceptance by the international com-
munity and focus on global rather than national interests. But freedom of
the seas, although a hallowed principle that has been cited as ajus cogens
norm,105 is more a rule of convenience than a moral imperative. Although
this concept arguably is important to international peace and order, its
recent erosion through unilateral assertions of jurisdiction over the seas
*within 200 miles of shore is widely accepted.' 0 6 Thus the first, and possibly
the second, proposed criteria require the rejection of this rule as ajus cogens
norm. Similarly, the prohibition of murder is eliminated as a jus cogens
norm. Although this rule is undoubtedly founded in morality, generally
accepted by the international community, and in the best interests of the
global community, it does not satisfy the second criterion. Rarely does an
individual murder affect the peace and order of the society of nations.
The four criteria' outlined, although not absoutely precise, provide a
rigorous test of the jus cogens character of any purportedly compelling
norm. The next section applies these criteria to the rule prohibiting nuclear
weapons proliferation to determine that rule's status.
103. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopied Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery,
done Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; G.A. Res. 2160, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 3, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (aggression).
104. Although international slavery, genocide, and aggression threaten international peace
and order, the effects of purely intranational conduct in violation of these norms is less obvi-
ous. The recent Cambodian situation illustrates how internal genocide can disrupt inter-
national stability. The aggressive reactions of first Vietnam, and then China, created
international turmoil. Similarly, an established domestic system of slavery would provoke
international opposition. Thus domestic conduct can be ruled illegal if it violates ajus cogens
norm.
105. See J. SZTUCKI, supra note 3, at 84.
106. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the Law of the Sea Conference provides
for an "exclusive economic zone," extending up to 200 miles from the baseline, over which a
nation exerts limited jurisdiction. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.I0 (1977) art. 57, reproduced in




NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION AND THE
JUS COGENS CRITERIA
In the most fundamental sense, nuclear weapons nonproliferation is a
moral issue within the parameters of the firstjus cogens criteria. Nuclear
weapons' awesome destructive power furnishes the necessary moral ele-
ment. In 1961, the U.N. General Assembly resolved that the use of nuclear
weapons was a violation of the letter and the spirit of the U.N. Charter and
a crime against mankind. 07
The importance of nonproliferation to international peace and order
satisfies the second criterion. The spread of nuclear weapons both disturbs
international balances of power and causes nations that perceive a threat to
their security to examine their own nuclear potential. After India demon-
strated its nuclear weapons capability in 1974, its rivals, particularly
Pakistan, felt threatened and sought to balance this new instability.'08 The
Pakistani scheme to buy nuclear technology capable of diversion to weap-
ons production was subsequently uncovered in considerable detail.10 9
Taiwan, in the wake of shifting U.S. relations, might seek to acquire
nuclear weapons to ensure its security." 10 It is widely believed that Israel"'
and perhaps South Africa t 12 possess nuclear weapons. If any of these
nations successfully demonstrates nuclear weapons capability, significant
new instability will be introduced into already tense regions.' "3 The furor
created by French plans to sell weapons-grade uranium to Iraq as part of a
107. Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons,
G.A. Res 1653(XVI), Nov. 24, 1961, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 4, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/4942/Add.3 (1961). The vote was 55-20-26.
108. After the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, then-President Bhutto of Pakistan said that
Pakistanis would "eat leaves of grass," if necessary, to match India's achievement. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 23, 1979, at 14, col. 1.
109. Pakistan reportedly purchased many of the materials necessary for the production of
enriched uranium on the world market through agents and subcontractors, possibly with the
economic assistance of Libya. See id; Id, Apr. 17, 1979, at A3, col. 3; id, Apr. 9, 1979, at A1,
ol. I.
110. A recently revealed 1974 CIA study predicted that Taiwan would be capable of
nuclear weapons production by 1979, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1978, at 5, col. 1, but Deputy
Foreign Minister Frederick Chen told reporters in late 1978, "We are not going into the
nuclear arms field." Id, Dec. 21, 1978, at A9, col. 5.
111. See note 40 supra.
112. U.S. satellites detected an apparent low-level nuclear explosion in the vicinity of South
Africa on September 22, 1979. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at Al, col. 1.
113. U.S. Secretary of State Vance commented on the reported South African detonation,
"The development of nuclear weapons by South Africa... would be destablizing and a dan-
gerous step forward." Id, Oct. 27, 1979, at A5, col. 2. A senior Pentagon official labeled the
possibility that a threshold nuclear weapons state, such as Brazil, Argentina, Israel, or
Pakistan, was responsible for the blast a "very serious menace to world stability." Id.
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research reactor deal illustrates the destabilizing effect of the sale of even
nuclear weapons potential on international order.' 1 4
The general international acceptance of the concept of nonprolifera-
tion satisfies the third criterion. U.N. General Assembly resolutions and
multilateral treaties provide ample evidence of this international accept-
ance.
In 1961, the General Assembly called on all states to respect Africa as a
"denuclearized zone."' 15 In the same year, the General Assembly unani-
mously adopted a resolution urging the adoption of a nonproliferation
treaty to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers
and the development or purchase of such weapons by the then-nonnuclear
states. 16 The Antarctic Treaty, also signed in 1961, prohibited all nuclear
explosions in Antarctica."17
In 1963, the General Assembly endorsed the denuclearization of Latin
America." 8 The Tlatelolco Treaty later implemented this policy." t9 Also
in 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water was signed.' 20 In 1965, a second General
Assembly Resolution confirming Africa as a nuclear-free zone passed even
more convincingly than the 1961 Resolution.' 2' The 1967 Outer Space
Treaty contained an agreement not to "place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons . . , install such weapons on celestial
114. The French plant manufacturing a nuclear reactor and fully-enriched fuel for sale to
Iraq was bombed on April 6, 1979. Id, Apr. 11, 1979, at A19, col. 3.
115. The resolution called upon members to refrain from conducting nuclear tests, storing,
and transporting nuclear weapons in or through Africa. Consideration of Africa as a
Denuclearized Zone, G.A. Res. 1652(XVI), Nov. 24, 1961, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 4,
U.N. Doc. A/4942/Add.2 (1961).
116. The General Assembly described the objective of such a treaty as "the cessation of all
nuclear weapons tests in all environments under [international] inspection and control machin-
ery." G.A. Res. 1649(XVI), Nov. 8, 1961, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 4, U.N. Doc.
A/4942/Add.2 (1961).
117. "1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste
material shall be prohibited." The Antarctic Treaty, art, V, entered intoforce June 23, 1961, 12
U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
118. Denuclearization of Latin America, G.A. Res. 1911 (XVIII), Nov. 27, 1963, 18 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 14, U.N. Doc. A/5618 (1963). The resolution originated in a declara-
tion by the presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico concerning their intent to
sign a multilateral agreement "whereby their countries would undertake not to manufacture,
receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices." 18 U.N. GAOR, 3
Annexes (Agenda Item 74) 1, U.N. Doc. A/5415/Rev.l (1963).
119. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, done Feb. 14,
1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 681.
120. Done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
121. Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, G.A. Res. 2033(XX), Dec. 3, 1965, 20
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 9, U.N. Doc. A/6127 (1965). The vote was 105-0-3.
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bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." 122
In 1968, the General Assembly commended 23 the final version of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the treaty itself was signed
later that year. ' 24 Opponents of the treaty argued against its double stand-
ard that permitted those nations already possessing nuclear weapons to
maintain and increase their stockpiles while prohibiting the acquisition of
such weapons by nonnuclear powers. Thus, even today India insists on a
halt to weapons production by the present nuclear powers before it will sign
the NPT.'25
Despite the lack of universal acceptance of the final draft of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, similar declarations of the international condemnation
of nuclear weapons followed its adoption. The Seabed Arms Control
Treaty was adopted in 1971.126 The 1978 Final Document of the Special
Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament 127 declared that "[n]on-
proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern." 28 The
ultimate objective is not merely nonproliferation but "general and complete
disarmament under effective international control."' 129
Although the principle of nonproliferation has not achieved the status
of customary international law, it is widely and strongly accepted by the
international community. Moreover, because the degree of international
acceptance is a variable factor in the jus cogens analysis, the moral basis
122. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. IV, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
123. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 2373(XXII), June 12,
1968, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16A) 5, U.N. Doc. A/6716/Add.l (1968). The vote was 95-
4-21.
124. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
125. See S. WILLIAMS, THE U.S., INDIA, AND THE BOMB 46-47 (1969); The Times
(London), June 15, 1978, at 7, col. h.
126. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, done
Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
127. U.N. Doc. A/Res/S-10/2, July 13, 1978, reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1016
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Final Document].
128. Id 36, at 1022.
129. Id 19, at 1020. This document also speaks of the "inalienable rights of all States to
apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy .... All States
should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for
peaceful uses of nuclear energy . d. 68, at 1026. This position follows the basic
formula of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see note 124 supra and accompanying text, in
allowing developing states access to nuclear power in exchange for their forbearance of
nuclear weapons. The two ideas embodied in these documents, the "inalienable" right to
nuclear power and the fundamental right to be free of nuclear war, are mutually exclusive,
however, so long as the safeguards on nuclear technology remain ineffective.
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and social importance of nonproliferation outweigh any lack of formal
acceptance. Thus nuclear weapons nonproliferation satisfies the third crite-
rion of a jus cogens norm.
The fourth and final criterion ofjus cogens requires that such norms
serve the interests of the international community rather than those of an
individual nation. The threat to world peace and stability caused by
nuclear weapons proliferation far outweighs any short-term strategic
advantage or enhanced prestige gained by one nation's acquisition of
nuclear weapons.130 Therefore, nonproliferation serves the international
interest in maintaining peace and order. In so doing, nuclear weapons non-
proliferation satisfies the final criterion of a jus cogens norm.
The classification of nuclear weapons nonproliferation as ajus cogens
norm can be tested by Sinclair's method' 3 ' of inquiring whether a treaty for
the sale of nuclear weapons would be legal. Such a sale has never occurred
despite the existence of an eager market for these weapons. Libya, sus-
pected of financing the Pakistani program to manufacture the "Islamic
bomb," 132 is unable to purchase nuclear weapons outright. Political con-
siderations certainly bear on this fact, but it is also true that such a sale
would be regarded as immoral, disruptive of international peace and secur-
ity, contrary to the expressed desires of the large majority of nations, and
against the best interests of all mankind. In short, such a sale is prohibited
by ajus cogens norm of international law.
Given the acknowledged inadequacy of present safeguards against the
diversion of nuclear technology and materials from peaceful international
trade to weapons production, thejus cogens norm of nonproliferation also
prohibits the sale of peaceful nuclear technology and materials. No specific
authority is needed to buttress this conclusion: "[it often happens that the
more fundamental a rule of law is, the more difficult it is to find specific
authority for it."' 33
IV
EVIDENCE OF STATE CONDUCT
Establishing ajus cogens norm prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear
weapons is more than an academic exercise. Evidence of state conduct con-
sistent with this norm is relevant to proving its existence and assessing its
practical importance. If thisjus cogens determination is valid, the rule of
130. "All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament nego-
tiations." Final Document, supra note 127, 28, at 1021.
131. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
132. See note 109 supra.
133. A. McNAIR, supra note 78, at 514.
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nuclear weapons nonproliferation must have a compelling stature gov-
erning international interactions regardless of national consent. Current
activities confirm this status.
No nuclear weapon has ever been sold. The numerous denials of
nuclear weapons ambitions also indicate the compelling nature of the non-
proliferation norm. The current Pakistani 134 and South African 135 nuclear
intrigues demonstrate that no nation is free to ignore international non-
proliferation expectations. As in the Indian and Israeli situations, other
factors figure in this forced adherence to the nonproliferation norm. But
the single common element is a fundamental compulsion arising from the
international community. The increasing acknowledgment of the inade-
quacy of present safeguards and the close relationship between nuclear
technology transfer and weapons proliferation extends the scope of thejus
cogens norm prohibiting proliferation to include the sale of materials and
technology that permit such proliferation. Canada, Australia, and the
United States, among others,136 reacted unilaterally to the new perception
of the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons.
The 1963 agreement 137 between Canada and India for the supply of
nuclear materials and technology, concluded prior to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, contained patently ineffective controls. India pledged merely to use
the materials for exclusively "peaceful" purposes.138 After India's "peace-
ful" nuclear explosion in 1974, Canada immediately suspended nuclear
aid. 139
This abuse of its nuclear assistance led to a reevaluation of Canada's
nuclear export policy. The nature of this reexamination and the substantive
nonproliferation measures adopted were consistent with jus cogens. Gov-
ernment spokesmen noted that "the first priority, indeed the overriding pri-
ority, [was] to prevent the spread of instruments of destruction."'140
Safeguards were strengthened by restricting nuclear exports to signatories
134. See note 109 supra.
135. See notes 112-13 supra.
136. See The Times (London), July 7, 1978, at 13, col. a and id., Mar. 7, 1978, at 17, col. a,
for discussions of Dutch concern over the sale of nuclear fuel to Brazil. This concern centered
on the inadequacy of safeguards to prevent the use of this fuel in weapons production.
137. Agreement for Nuclear Assistance, Dec. 19, 1963, Canada-India, [19631 Can. T.S. No.
10, 529 U.N.T.S. 45.
138. Id, art. IX.
139. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1974, at Al, col. 4. India reportedly used plutonium furnished
by Canada. Id, May 28, 1974, at A2, col. 4. Contra, id, at A2, col. 4 (Indian authorities
denied violation of Canadian agreement).
140. Statement by Donald Jamieson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs
(Dec. 22, 1976), reprinted in 1976 DISARMAMENT DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 951, 952.
Secretary Jamieson described nuclear export policy as "raising ... fundamental issues affect-
ing world economic growth and world peace." Id. at 951.
1980]
84 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and nonsignatory states that accepted inter-
national safeguards. 14 1 In setting what it felt should be "a compelling
example for other nuclear suppliers,"'t 42 Canada acted against its economic
interests as a nuclear supplier.
Australia, which possesses twenty percent of the known western
reserves of uranium, is increasing its safeguards against the diversion of
its nuclear exports. 143 The 1977 Ranger report on the mining and export
of Australian uranium concluded that "[tihe nuclear power industry is
unintentionally contributing to an increased risk of nuclear war."'144 The
report recommended the cessation of sales to nonsignatories of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, increased safeguards against the diversion of fuel to
weapons production, full inspection of all nuclear installations in the recipi-
ent state, increased cooperation among nuclear suppliers in developing
more effective safeguards, and the regular review of Australian export pol-
icy.145 Perhaps most surprisingly, the report advocated a unilateral restric-
tion of nuclear energy production despite the adverse domestic economic
consequences of such a policy.146
The United States strongly reacted to the recognition of the inadequa-
cies of present safeguards and the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Soon after taking office, President Carter noted that proliferation has "con-
sequences for all nations" and "direct implications for peace and secur-
ity.' 1 4 7 To counteract this threat, the President decided to defer U.S.
commercial reprocessing and plutonium recycling, defer and restructure the
breeder reactor program, promote research into alternative nuclear fuel
cycles, and establish an international fuel cycle evaluation program. 48 The
President also decided to "embargo the export of equipment or technology
that would permit uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing.' '149
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978150 echoed President
Carter's determination to compel a reevaluation of international nuclear
safeguards. The Act requires the renegotiation of virtually all of the
nuclear cooperation agreements between the United States and foreign
states to ensure the existence of adequate safeguards on transferred technol-
141. Id. at 952.
142. Id. at 953.
143. See The Times (London), July 21, 1978, at 5, col. e.
144. 1977 LLOYD'S MAR. AND COM. L.Q. 135.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. President's Statement, supra note 55, at 506.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 3201-3282, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2074-2160a (West Supp. 1979).
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ogy and materials.' 5 1 The Act further endorses strengthening and
expanding the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, 152 the uni-
versal adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,' 5 3 and continuing over-
sight of nuclear materials and technology of U.S. origin. 54
Foreign nations argue that unilateral U.S. action and the possible
abrogation of existing supply contracts and treaty commitments for U.S.
exports are illegal. 155 When informed that existing U.S.-Indian supply con-
tracts are subject to the new Act, Indian Prime Minister Desai responded by
claiming that no domestic U.S. legislation could override contracts between
two nations.1 56 Although international law supports the Indian position
that one party to a treaty cannot plead illegality under domestic law to
escape its obligations,' 57 an exception exists when the relevant treaty con-
flicts with a jus cogens norm.158  The jus cogen norm proposed here-
prohibiting nuclear proliferation and the international sale of nuclear tech-
nology that contributes to proliferation-supports the U.S. position. 
59
151. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2135c (West Supp. 1979).
152. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3241 (West Supp. 1979).
153. Id. § 3201.
154. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2160 (West Supp. 1979).
155. French officials raised this argument. See The Times (London), July 11, 1978, at 5,
col. b. France originally adopted a similar position with respect to its own nuclear supply
contracts. After the French Council for Foreign Nuclear Policy decided to stop the exporta-
tion of reprocessing plants, a government official stated that an existing contract with Pakistan
would be unaffected. Interview with French Minister of Foreign Affairs de Guiringuad (Dec.
16, 1976), reprintedin 1976 DISARMAMENT DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 944.
France eventually canceled the Pakistani contract in 1978. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1979,
at 14, col. 4. The legal justification for this action was not announced, but strong statements by
the United States, voicing its concern over the proliferation problems connected with such
plants, probably played a role in this reversal.
156. The Times (London), Jan. 13, 1978, at 6, col. c.
157. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 27: "A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
158. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
159. The international legal doctrines of mistake and rebus sic stantibus could also be cited
in support of the U.S. position. Article 48 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 62, provides:
I. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by
the treaty if the error relates to afact or situation which was assumed by that State to
exist at the time when the treaty was concluded andfarmed an essential basis of its con-
sent to be bound by the treaty.
(emphasis added). The mistaken presumption of the adequacy of safeguards against diversion
would constitute the ground for invalidity here.
Article 62 of the Convention concerns rebus sic stantibus, or a "[flundamental change of
circumstances." It provides:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the
treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
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The United States is using reason and negotiation to strengthen export
controls and to reevaluate the plutonium-based nuclear economy in light of
the increased risks of proliferation and terrorism. This policy sensibly
avoids confrontation by attempting to persuade other nations to accept a
role in reducing these dangers. Recently, this approach began to bear fruit.
The London "Suppliers Club" conferences now include fifteen nations
160
that agree on common export safeguards.' 61 The United States also se-
cured international commitments to reevaluate the nuclear fuel cycle at the
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference scheduled to end
in late 1979.162
Like the Canadian and Australian situations, restricting nuclear
exports and compelling the reevaluation of nuclear safeguards through the
1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and the London Suppliers Conferences
conflict with domestic economic interests.' 63 But, given thejus cogens stat-
ure of the nonproliferation norm, this position rests on firm legal ground.
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 62. Once again, the subsequent recognition of the
inadequacy of safeguards would serve as the basis for a claim of invalidity.
One commentator described ajus cogens argument in support of the position adopted by the
United States as a "still bolder assertion." See Szegilongi, supra note 35, at 860. Szegilongi's
assessment of the jus cogens argument, however, is based on his assumption that fits cogens
must be proved by universal acceptance of the norm rather than general acceptance. Not only
does jus cogens status not depend exclusively on universal acceptance, see notes 96-97 supra,
but also universal acceptance alone does not insure ./ls cogens status. See note 97 supra.
An American legal position based on mistake and rebus sic stantibus is indeed less "bold"
and lends itself to easier proof than ajus cogens claim. Only thejus cogens theory, however,
comprehensively explains the international and intranational conduct relating to proliferation.
Nuclear export programs were intended to promote the expansion of peaceful nuclear technol-
ogy while preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. Exporters assumed that the two goals
were not mutually exclusive. If no effective safeguards presently exist, the jus cogens theory
compels the conclusion that nonproliferation, ajus cogens norm, must prevail over other inten-
tions.
160. See The Times (London), Jan. 13, 1978, at 6, col. a. This group includes the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Ger-
many, France, Holland, Italy, Japan, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany.
161. See Nuclear Suppliers Group: Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, reprinted in 17 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 220 (1978).
162. Sixty-six nations are represented at the conference. In a draft report issued in
November 1979, the conferees stated their failure to agree on more effective safeguards. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 4, 1979, at AI, col. 1. The report concluded that there are no technical means of
preventing the expansion of peaceful nuclear technology from increasing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Id.
163. As of August 1978, the European Economic Community depended on the United
States for 99% of its enriched nuclear fuel, but the Eurodif enrichment plant in France and
Eurenco plants in Holland and Great Britain will change the situation. The EEC expects to
meet two-thirds of its enriched fuel requirements from these plants by 1980, and 75% by 1985.
NUCLEAR NEWS, supra note 26, at 54.
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With the U.S. lead, other concerned nations might act to increase safe-
guards; without it there is little hope of developing better safeguards.
CONCLUSION
fus cogens is an emerging doctrine with a potentially dynamic future.
The criteria forjus cogens norms set forth in this Note yield largely correct
results, but they are not propounded as precise tests ofjus cogens character.
Rather, they are proposed as a rigorous set of checks to evaluate the jus
cogens character of a purported norm of international law. Measured
against these standards, the prohibition of nuclear weapons proliferation
shares the status of the jus cogens prohibitions of slavery, genocide, and
aggression.
In the final analysis, "[I]t [is] not the form of a rule but the particular
nature of the subject matter with which it deal[s] that might give it the char-
acter of jus cogens .... ,164 The potentially awesome consequences of
nuclear proliferation demonstrate that it is such ajus cogens subject matter
calling for strict scrutiny of national and international endeavors in the
nuclear field. Current state practice confirms this conclusion.
In light of this jus cogens norm, the heretofore prolific international
trade in nuclear technology must be restrained because of the acknowl-
edged inability of present safeguards to prevent the spread of nuclear weap-
ons. The demonstrated link between the sale of peaceful nuclear
technology and the production of nuclear weapons requires the removal of
nuclear technology from international commerce until more effective safe-
guards are developed. This is thejus cogens consequence propounded by
this Note: Insofar as nuclear technology transfers permit or facilitate the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in violation of ajus cogens norm, these
transfers are illegal.
Walter T Gangl*
164. OfficialRecords supra note 73, at 303 (remarks of Stephan Verosta, Austrian Repre-
sentative).
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